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THE DEATH OF PRIVATE PRACTICE: HOW
THE RISING COST OF HEALTHCARE IS
DESTROYING PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY
ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, the number of physicians in private practice
has dropped dramatically. This trend is the result of the financial pressure
imposed by the federal government in response to the skyrocketing cost of
healthcare. Physicians, frustrated by stagnant reimbursement rates in
conjunction with increased administrative costs and overhead, are choosing
hospital staff employment in favor of private practice. This trend is to the
detriment of the physician, the taxpayers, and, most importantly, the patients.
Patients treated in hospital outpatient settings have worse outcomes than
those treated in private practice. In addition, hospital procedures cost both
the government and private insurers more per procedure, adding to the
increase in healthcare expenditures. This is due to the discrepancy in
reimbursement rates; Medicare pays hospitals substantially more than
private physicians for the same procedures. This Note attempts to clarify the
financial and ethical consequences of hospital-centered healthcare delivery,
as well to identify the major contributors to the rising cost of healthcare in
the United States. This Note also proposes changes to the healthcare system
that will lower expenditures by focusing on pharmaceutical drug costs,
private health insurance, and the role of hospital systems.
INTRODUCTION
“It is naive to think that a patient’s ability to pay wouldn’t affect the
practice of medicine.”1
Imagine a healthcare system so unaffordable that a cancer patient must
mortgage his or her home in order to pay for the drugs necessary to combat
the disease. A goal that almost every American strives to accomplish, that is,
owning a home, is gone in an instant. Imagine also that every routine checkup
or mild fever required a trip to the hospital, having to see a different treating
physician each time. In the absence of any personal relationship and
continuity, a patient becomes just a number on a chart; healthcare in turn
becomes just another industry. This scenario might appear to be a gratuitous
and dystopian parallel of the United States healthcare system, but if the
healthcare industry is allowed to continue on its current course, it could be a
reality that millions of Americans will face every day.
Although the United States is one of the most advanced countries in the
world, it continues to lag behind other developed nations in both healthcare
1. Catherine Arnst, Going Broke to Stay Alive, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 30, 2006, 12:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-01-29/going-broke-to-stay-alive (quoting
Dr. Leonard Saltz of Memorial-Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, discussing his concerns regarding
the unsustainable price of cancer treatment drugs).
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costs and healthcare delivery.2 This can be attributed to the government’s
facilitation of the demise of physician private practice in favor of large
companies—a misguided attempt to mitigate costs and improve patient care.3
These excess costs are the result of shortsighted legislation, conceding
guaranteed profits to the pharmaceutical industry,4 subsidizing the health
insurance industry,5 and allowing anti-competitive hospital systems to
continue to grow throughout the country.6 If the United States healthcare
industry stays on the current path, the unsustainable cost of Personal Health
Care (PHC) will fundamentally change the way healthcare is delivered and
managed in this country.
In an effort to mitigate the rising costs, and in spite of potential savings
from the various industries, Congress is squeezing doctors out of private
practice.7 Due to Congress’s refusal to increase physician reimbursements,
while simultaneously imposing more regulation and compliance costs,
physicians are closing down privately owned practices and clinics in record
numbers.8 This fundamental shift, from primarily a clinical to a hospital
setting, has changed the way healthcare is delivered. The hospital model
encourages consolidation and expansion, resulting in reduced competition
and increased costs. Drug costs are increasing at an even higher rate than
PHC. This is due in large part to Congress divesting the government of its
ability to negotiate with the pharmaceutical industry. 9 Instead, Congress
should look to cut costs without compromising the practice of medicine. The
best way to accomplish this would be to negotiate with pharmaceutical
companies, increase insurance companies’ benefits floor, and de-incentivize
a hospital-based system.
Cutting these unnecessary costs will not only save taxpayers hundreds of
billions of dollars, but will return the practice of medicine back into the hands
2. DEAN BAKER, REDUCING WASTE WITH AN EFFICIENT MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT (2013), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/medicare-drug-2012-12.pdf.
3. See generally EZEKIEL EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: HOW THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WILL IMPROVE OUR TERRIBLY COMPLEX, BLATANTLY UNJUST,
OUTRAGEOUSLY EXPENSIVE, GROSSLY INEFFICIENT, ERROR PRONE SYSTEM 18–36 (2014)
(Ezekiel Emanuel had an integral role in shaping the Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010. He was
a White House special advisor on health policy to the Obama Administration, and many of his
opinions were fully realized in the final bill); see also Ezekiel Emanuel, Inside the Making of
Obamacare, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2014, 1:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052
702303824204579421553914382752.
4. See BAKER, supra note 2.
5. See Thomas Rice et al., Challenges Facing the United States of America in Implementing
Universal Coverage, 92 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 894, 896–97 (2014).
6. See Anthony G. Charles et. al., The Employed Surgeon: A Changing Professional Paradigm,
148 JAMA SURGERY 323, 327–28 (2013).
7. See generally MATTHEW T. MILONE, OWNERSHIP OF MEDICAL PRACTICES AFTER THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, (ASPATORE) (2013), Westlaw 3772669.
8. See id. “Independent medical practices are facing increasing threats to their existence. In the
face of declining or stagnant reimbursements, the costs of running a medical practice have increased
dramatically.” Id. at *4.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102 (2012).
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of physicians. These savings will enable Congress to divest both the health
insurance and hospital industries of their power over physicians, allowing the
professionals to dictate healthcare, instead of the profits. A reallocation of
these resources will facilitate an increase in physician reimbursement, while
simultaneously lower unnecessary costs. This will alleviate the financial
burden on physicians and allow them to determine the type and amount of
care each patient will receive.
This Note highlights aspects of the current healthcare system and the
reasons for the massive increase in spending. Part I provides a brief history
of the Medicare system, specifically Medicare Part B, and demonstrates the
enormous discrepancy between physician reimbursements in relation to
overall healthcare costs. Part II introduces the issues with Medicare Part D,
the drug reimbursement program, and proposes a simple yet substantive
method for cutting costs. Part III addresses the other two major healthcare
industries, insurance and hospital systems, and highlights how Congress has
enabled these industries to thrive. Part IV addresses the rising administrative
overhead costs associated with private practice, which has led to its decline.
In addition, this Note explains how the various parties and industries interact,
with both each other and the federal government.
I. THE RISING COST OF HEALTH CARE
There is a common misconception that physicians are already well
compensated and that they may actually be responsible for the rising
healthcare costs in this country.10 Comparing the relative salaries of United
States physicians with those of their European counterparts often reinforces
this misconception.11 However, this comparison is not analogous and yields
little to no accurate or useful information, because the comparison does not
take into account the extraordinary costs of administrative compliance,12
malpractice insurance,13 or prescription drugs.14

10. Elizabeth Rosenthal, Medicine’s Top Earners Are Not the M.D.’s, N.Y. TIMES (May 17,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/sunday-review/doctors-salaries-are-not-the-big-cost.
html?ref=opinion&_r=0.
11. Sarah Kliff, What Doctors Earn When They Graduate, In One Chart, VOX (May 8, 2014,
7:20 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/5/8/5692058/what-doctors-earn-when-they-graduate-in-onechart.
12. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Hospital-Physician Relations: Two Tracks and the Decline of
the Voluntary Medical Staff Model, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1305 (2008).
13. See Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform,
J ECON. PERSPECT., Spring 2011, at 93–94.
14. New Medicare Data Available to Increase Transparency on Physician Utilization, CTR. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter New Medicare Data], https://www.
cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-06-012.html.
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The total cost of PHC in the United States amounted to more than $3.2
trillion in 2015.15 Out of the $3.2 trillion, which amounts to more than onesixth of the United States’ gross domestic product (GDP), only $502 billion
is paid to physicians.16 The rest is split between hospitals (over $1 trillion),
insurance companies (over $1 trillion), and the pharmaceutical industry
($324 billion).17 Medicare and Medicaid costs alone consumed over $1.1
trillion.18 PHC costs are projected to skyrocket to roughly 20.1% of GDP by
the year 2025.19 This staggering number has prompted Congress to take
measures to cut healthcare spending in many different ways. 20 Physicians
have borne the brunt of this reform via stagnant reimbursement rates.
In fact, in the past ten years, physician reimbursement rates under
Medicare have barely risen at all.21 Unable to keep up with ever-rising costs,
physicians’ private practices are continuing to shut down, leaving doctors
with few options.22 The number of physicians employed by hospitals has
increased by 84% over the last two years.23 There are a few obvious solutions
to this problem; specifically, cutting prescription drug costs by removing the
“no interference” clause in Medicare Part D, and cutting insurance costs by
raising the premium-to-benefit rule from 80% to 90%.24
A. MEDICARE IN GENERAL
Congress created Medicare in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act.25 The concept of Medicare originated during the Great
Depression, during which vast swaths of indigent and disabled Americans

15. NAT’L HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2015 HIGHLIGHTS (2015), https://www.cms.gov/researchstatistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/high
lights.pdf [hereinafter 2015 HIGHLIGHTS].
16. See TABLE 9 PHYSICIAN SERVICES EXPENDITURES; LEVELS, PERCENT CHANGE AND
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, BY SOURCE OF FUNDS: CALENDAR YEARS 1998-2015 (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/national
healthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html; see also 2015 HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 15.
17. Nat’l Health Expenditure Fact Sheet, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html (last updated Mar. 21,
2017, 7:58 AM); 2015 HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 15.
18. Fact Sheet, supra note 17.
19. Forecast Summary, NAT’L HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS, https://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
20. See David Morgan, Obama Administration Seeks to Negotiate Medicare Drug Prices,
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/02/us-usa-budgetmedicare-iduskbn0l61ow20150202.
21. See MILONE, supra note 7, at *1.
22. See id.
23. Casalino et. al., supra note 12, at 1308.
24. Susan Adler Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003: Will It Be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 14 ELDER L.J. 237, 253 (2006).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012).
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suffered from a lack of healthcare access.26 The purpose of Medicare is to
provide health insurance for elderly (aged sixty-five years and over) and
disabled citizens, ensuring that these vulnerable citizens have access to
critical healthcare resources.27 Initially, Medicare consisted of only hospital
insurance (Part A),28 but Congress later expanded the program to cover
physicians’ services (Part B)29 and prescription drug costs (Part D).30 Over
the years, the cost of Medicare and the state-run (but federally subsidized)
Medicaid has grown out of control, imposing an unsustainable cost on
taxpayers.31 The Medicare system is integral to the American healthcare
system; however, years of quick fixes and Band-Aid legislation have created
an unstable and unsustainable behemoth, which shows no signs of slowing
down.
Although there may be a myriad of factors contributing to this cost,
including complexity and scope, there are clear and obvious ways to reel in
Medicare spending, allowing a reallocation of resources to thereby improve
healthcare delivery and patient care. For example, the Medicare drug
reimbursement program, imposed by Medicare Part B and Part D, is
financially unregulated.32 These programs are costing the government
billions of dollars in retail prices to pharmaceutical companies.33 Instead of
maintaining the status quo, Congress must make efforts to reduce the cost of
drugs to reflect the costs that other government programs pay for the same
medications.
B. MEDICARE PART B
Congress enacted Medicare Part B to provide Medicare beneficiaries
with insurance to cover health services outside of a hospital setting.34
Medicare Part B covers non-hospital physician, clinical, and surgical
services, as well as drugs administered in the clinical setting, such as by
doctors or other providers in private practice.35 In 2015, the Obama
Administration mandated that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) distinguish certain aspects of the Part B expenditures,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See generally EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 18–36.
42 U.S.C. § 1395c.
See generally EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 18–36.
42 U.S.C. § 1395j.
Id. § 1395w-101.
Health Profile Health Expenditure, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [hereinafter
Health Profile], http://www.compareyourcountry.org/health?page=2&cr=gbr&cr1=oecd&lg=en
(last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
32. Channick, supra note 24, at 253.
33. See Morgan, supra note 20.
34. What Part B Covers, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.medicare.
gov/what-medicare-covers/part-b/what-medicare-part-b-covers.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2017);
see BARBARA S. KLEES & CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE, BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID
(2011).
35. KLEES & WOLFE, supra note 34.
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specifically the amount paid out to physicians for actual services and the
amount paid to pharmaceutical companies for drugs administered to patients
in the clinical setting.36 The lack of transparency between the cost of actual
physician services and the cost of drug reimbursement substantially inflated
the Medicare Part B figures.37
As healthcare costs in the United States continue to rise relative to GDP,
one could logically assume that physician reimbursement would rise as
well.38 At first glance, however, it appears that the physician reimbursement
rate has remained relatively constant in relation to the overall cost of
healthcare. Physician reimbursement rates have risen from 4.9% of the total
PHC expenditure in 1980, to 5.4% in 2012.39 However, the lack of
transparency in CMS cost reports resulted in significant inflation of the
reimbursement rates for physicians.40 This is attributed to the fact that
Medicare Part B never reported the distinction between payments for services
and payments for pharmaceuticals administered to patients in a clinical or
practice setting.41
This data revealed that a substantial portion of physician reimbursement
went to cover drug costs, and not to physicians as payment for services.42 The
drug reimbursement program is pre-set by Medicare and is essentially dollar
for dollar, often leaving the physician’s practice to operate at a loss. In fact,
Congress set the reimbursement rate for physician-administered drugs at
106%43 of the cost of the drugs, in a failed attempt to cover the cost of drugs
and administrative overhead only.44
This distinction is not insignificant, as drug reimbursement costs can
amount to double the reimbursement for actual physician services.45 For
example, the CMS released the Medicare Part B expenditures for the year
2013.46 This information shed light on the previously reported47 (and inflated)
36.
37.
38.
39.

New Medicare Data, supra note 14.
Id.
Health Profile, supra note 31.
See TABLE 1.2 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), TOTAL PERSONAL HEALTH CARE
(PHC) EXPENDITURES, PHYSICIAN PHC, TOTAL MEDICARE PHC, AND MEDICARE PHYSICIAN
PHC, CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medi
careMedicaidStatSupp/Downloads/2013_Section1.pdf#Table1.2 [hereinafter TABLE 1.2].
40. New Medicare Data, supra note 14.
41. Id.
42. Id. “This analysis shows that a large portion of the costs for several of these specialties is
due to the cost of drugs administered.” Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“[I]n the case of a single source drug or biological
(as defined in subsection (c)(6)(D) of this section), 106 percent of the amount determined.”).
44. It can be inferred that the increase in drug costs do not contribute to actual physician income.
45. CMS Releases Prescriber-Level Medicare Data for First Time, CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES (Apr. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Prescriber-Level Medicare Data], https://www.
cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-04-30.html.
46. Id.
47. TABLE 1.2, supra note 39.
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reimbursement rates for physicians, which indicated that physicians received
over $99 billion from Medicare during the 2012 calendar year.48 For some
specialties, the Average Medicare Allowed Amount per Provider Drug
Services was double the Average Medicare Allowed Amount per Provider
Medical Services.49 To help illustrate this discrepancy, in 2013, Medicare
reimbursed a hematologist–oncologist an average of $583,237 in drugs
administered to patients, but only $225,379 in services rendered.50 Similarly,
a rheumatologist in the same year was paid an average of $265,011 for drug
reimbursement, but only $128,187 in services rendered.51
Although these two specialties are admittedly on the high end of the
spectrum (with respect to the value of drugs versus overall reimbursement),
the lack of distinction between payments for drugs and payments for services
illustrates the significant discrepancy in physician reimbursement rates.52 It
is clear that the amount of reported physician reimbursement under Medicare
has been grossly inaccurate, inflating the perceived burden that physicians’
services cost the United States. Even more alarming is the fact that any
perceived physician rate increase can be attributed to rising drug costs,53 not
an increase in the physician fee schedule.
Although this data is now available, it has not yet been scrutinized. It is
a step in the right direction; however, it is impossible to determine the scope
and consequences that may result from shedding light on this distinction.
Initial figures by the Congressional Budget Office indicate that the physicians
Medicare fee schedule amounted to only $70 billion in 2014,54 as compared
to $262 billion for overall Part B costs.55 Moreover, Part B expenditures are
projected to increase by 12% to $295 billion in 2017, while the physician fee
schedule is projected to decrease by 11% during that same span.56 The
accurate reporting of the Medicare Part B cost breakdown will allow a better
and more complete understanding of the magnitude and burden that the
pharmaceutical industry places on the PHC. In addition, it illustrates that
48. See TABLE 9.9 SERVICES, SUBMITTED AND ALLOWED CHARGES, AND PROGRAM
PAYMENTS FOR MEDICARE PHYSICIAN AND SUPPLIER SERVICES, BY LEADING HCPCS CODES:
CALENDAR YEAR 2012 (2013), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/Downloads/2013_Table9_9.pdf?agree=
yes&next=Accept [hereinafter TABLE 9.9].
49. Physician and Other Supplier Data, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES
[hereinafter Other Supplier Data], https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Physician-and-OtherSupplier2013.html (last updated Dec. 20, 2016, 2:05 PM).
50. New Medicare Data, supra note 14.
51. See TABLE 9.9, supra note 48; Other Supplier Data, supra note 49.
52. See New Medicare Data, supra note 14.
53. See id.
54. March 2015 Medicare Baseline, CONG. BUDGET’S OFF. (Mar. 9, 2015) [hereinafter March
Medicare Baseline], https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51302-2015-03-medi
care.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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physician reimbursement is not growing in relation to the overall PHC. The
percentage of Part B expenses that go directly to the pharmaceutical industry
is, in addition to payments under Medicare Part D, the major federal drug
assistance program.
II. THE COST OF DRUGS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY
A. MEDICARE PART D
In addition to the discrepancy between physician services and drug
reimbursement figures, the Medicare drug reimbursement program, known
as Medicare Part D, represents a massive expense for the federal
government.57 Congress enacted Medicare Part D to help beneficiaries pay
for prescription drugs, such as those prescribed by physicians but not
administered in practice settings.58 The Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 created the Medicare Part D
program.59
Medicare Part D has become an essential aspect of the Medicare system,
greatly alleviating the cost of drugs to Medicare beneficiaries. However,
instead of enacting a fair program that allows CMS to negotiate drug prices,
Medicare Part D provides the pharmaceutical industry with guaranteed
profits.60 One of the most concerning provisions of this legislation, called the
“no interference” clause,61 eliminated the power of CMS to set prices or
negotiate with pharmaceutical companies.62 As a result, the United States
government pays full retail price for pharmaceutical drugs under Medicare
Part D; “nearly twice as high per person spending” compared to other
industrialized countries.63

57. “The dataset describes the specific medications prescribed and statistics on their utilization
and costs. It provides data on more than one million distinct health care providers who collectively
prescribed $103 billion in prescription drugs under the Part D program.” Prescriber-Level Medicare
Data, supra note 45.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111 (2012).
59. Id.
60. See BAKER, supra note 2.
61. Channick, supra note 24, at 253 n.88.
62. “Reimbursement for Medicare Part D is not based on the prices for pharmaceuticals set by
CMS. In fact, one of the most contentious pieces of the MMA is its direct prohibition of
administered pricing or even negotiations of drug pricing by the director of CMS or the Secretary
of HHS.” Channick, supra note 24, at 253.
63. See BAKER, supra note 2.
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B. PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS AND THE NO-INTERFERENCE
CLAUSE
Although President Obama attempted to rectify64 this legislation, his
administration received considerable pushback from Congress.65 The
rationale behind the “no interference” clause is devoid of logic—other federal
programs and agencies, such as Medicaid and the Veterans Benefits
Administration, are able to negotiate and pay nearly half the amount the
federal government does for the same medication under Medicare.66 This
statutory removal of bargaining power was, and still is, a boon for the
pharmaceutical industry, allowing the corporate and profit-driven entities to
set their own prices, with no ability for competitive market forces to combat
these corporate interests.67
Congress has effectively guaranteed retail profits for drugs to
pharmaceutical companies, with little or nothing in return.68 The lack of
negotiating power leaves the government at the mercy of pharmaceutical
companies. With no protection from the market, annual Medicare retail
prescription drug expenditures increased by 10.7% in 2013, compared with a
.5% decrease in those same expenditures by private health insurance.69 These
drug expenditures consume a larger portion of the scarce Medicare resources,
decreasing the amount of reimbursement available for actual patient services,
such as preventative screenings.
The pharmaceutical industry’s profit windfall since the enactment of
Medicare Part D has helped fuel the massive wave of consolidation in the
healthcare industry.70 In 2016, industry leaders Pfizer and Allergan attempted
a $160 billion merger, following the merger of Allergan and Actavis earlier
that year.71 Another alarming trend has been the substantial increase in

64. See Morgan, supra note 20 (explaining that President Obama acknowledged the rising cost
of Part D drugs, and its increased burden on the Medicare budget. This was in response to a
pharmaceutical company charging $84,000 for a single dose of an essential hepatitis drug).
65. Id.
66. Channick, supra note 24, at 253; see also Tami Luhby, Here’s One Fix for High Drug Prices,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 28, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/28/news/economy/medi
care-drug-prices.
67. See Morgan, supra note 20.
68. Channick, supra note 24, at 253.
69. Retail Prescription Drug Expenditures; Levels, Percent Change, and Percent Distribution,
by Source of Funds, NAT’L HEALTH EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTS, https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last updated Dec. 6,
2016, 8:00 AM).
70. Paul R. La Monica, Health Care Mergers Are Out of Control, CNN MONEY (Oct. 29, 2015,
1:34 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/29/investing/health-care-mergers-pfizer-allergan/index.
html?iid=EL.
71. Id.
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pharmaceutical industry CEO salaries.72 Such salaries have increased twoand-a-half fold since 2004, from a total of roughly $75 million to nearly $200
million, including a $58 million jump during the first year that Medicare Part
D was enacted.73 This alarming trend reinforces the fact that the
pharmaceutical industry is making record profits at the expense of the
taxpayers.
If the federal government were allowed to negotiate drug prices and pay
rates similar to those of other industrialized nations, the United States would
save an estimated $541.3 billion over the next ten years.74 In addition,
beneficiaries would save $112.4 billion and state governments would save
another $72.7 billion over that same period.75 These staggering figures seem
titanic in relation to physician reimbursement.76 The savings from drug costs
amount to nearly 80% of physician reimbursement over the same ten-year
span.77
If just a fraction of this amount is instead reallocated to increase
physician reimbursement, it may reverse the current trend and allow
physicians to remain in private practice. Moreover, allowing the federal
government to exercise its immense bargaining power would require drug
manufacturers to maintain some semblance of price predictability, shielding
sick patients from CEOs who can, for example, decide on a whim to increase
the price of essential cancer and AIDS medications by 5,500% overnight.78
Just in the past year, Mylan, the producer of the emergency anaphylaxis
treatment, EpiPen, increased the cost of this product by over 500%.79 The “no
interference” clause invites such tactics by effectively disarming the
government’s ability to negotiate drug prices, and patients who can no longer
afford to pay for lifesaving treatment are feeling the consequences.
Repealing the “no-interference” clause does not necessarily require the
pharmaceutical industry to take a global economic loss. The United States
should not be in the business of inhibiting or deterring the research and
development of life-saving drugs. However, neither should it be in the
72. Ethan Rome, Big Pharma CEOs Rake in $1.57 Billion in Pay, HUFFINGTON POST (May 8,
2013, 8:19 AM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ethan-rome/big-pharma-ceo-pay_b_3236641.
html.
73. Id.
74. See BAKER, supra note 2.
75. Id.
76. March Medicare Baseline, supra note 54.
77. Id.
78. Paul R. La Monica, Martin Shkreli Quits as Turing CEO, CNN MONEY (Dec. 18, 2015,
12:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/18/investing/martin-shkreli-arrest-turing-kalobios/
(Martin Shkreli, CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, bought the rights to the drug Daraprim, a drug
used to alleviate the most debilitating symptoms of cancer and AIDS. Turing promptly increased
the price of each pill from $13.50 to $750. With no generic alternative, Turing was able to price
gouge Medicare for this necessary medication.)
79. Epipen Makers to Pay Massive $465 Million Fine for Ripping Off Medicaid Over the
Lifesaving Device, DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/epipen-makerspay-465-million-fine-ripping-medicaid-article-1.2822016 (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
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business of subsidizing the cost of drugs for foreign governments. Ideally,
the outcome will merely shift the United States’ disproportionate financial
burden back to developed nations, who should be paying at least the same
amount. This simple solution is an attempt at evening the playing field by
restoring the government’s ability fairly participate in the market place.
III. CORPORATE INFLUENCE
The American Medical Association (AMA) promulgated the Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine (the Doctrine) in 193480 to protect physician
autonomy and dictate patient care by prohibiting corporate interests from
interfering with medical judgments.81 The Doctrine inevitably led to a
healthcare model dominated by physician-owned private practices,
supplemented with voluntary hospital privileges.82 However, in light of the
systemic problems that physicians face, their ability to maintain private
practices is dwindling. Physicians are turning away from private practice in
favor of hospital employment at an alarming rate.83 This is due in large part
to administrative burdens,84 financial infeasibility,85 and career
dissatisfaction.86
Physicians’ pay has essentially remained flat, averaging a 0.7% annual
increase between 2003 and 2014.87 One popular alternative is for physicians
to join hospital staffs as attending physicians.88 This trend carries a heavy
burden—physicians are increasingly dissatisfied with their profession and
work-life balance.89 Given that physicians endure over ten years of postsecondary education and training and are the sole professionals qualified to
deliver healthcare, it is concerning that the professional outlook is so bleak.90

80. See MILONE, supra note 7.
81. Id. The Doctrine began as banning any entity other than a physician from owning a medical

practice. Id.
82. Casalino et. al., supra note 12.
83. See Charles et. al., supra note 6, at 323–28 (physician self-employment dropped from 48%
in 2001 to 33% in 2009).
84. Tait D. Shanafelt et al., Burnout and Satisfaction with Work-Life Balance Among US
Physicians Relative to the General US Population, 172 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1377, 1384 (2012).
85. MILONE, supra note 7.
86. Liselotte N. Dyrbye, et al., Physician Satisfaction and Burnout at Different Career Stages,
MAYO CLINIC, Dec. 2013, at 1358–67.
87. Actually, The SGR Has Slowed Health Care Cost Growth, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED.
BUDGET (Mar. 13, 2014), http://crfb.org/blogs/actually-sgr-has-slowed-health-care-cost-growth.
88. Gardiner Harris, More Doctors Giving Up Private Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/health/policy/26docs.html?_r=1.
89. Shanafelt et al., supra note 84, at 1377.
90. Id.
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A. HOSPITALS
Hospitals cost the United States $936.9 billion in 2013.91 This figure
represents an increase; hospitals were paid $882 billion in 2012, which was
5.4% of GPD.92 The 2013 figure includes the $239 billion Medicare paid
hospitals, which was 44.6% of total Medicare expenditures.93 In comparison,
$730 billion was spent on social security and $650 billion was spent on
national defense that same year.94 These figures do not include the cost of
physician care—they only include the cost of administration, drug prices, and
hospital upkeep.95
The increasing prevalence of hospital systems is the direct result of
financial incentives created to further that purpose.96 Prior to the 1980’s,
hospitals both expanded in size and grew in number due to many factors.97
The most prominent factor was Congress’ willingness to essentially
guarantee profits with federal funds; hospitals billed Medicare for costs plus
a percentage on the top intended for capital expenditures and growth.98
Congress finally recognized this issue and changed the reimbursement
methods. However, the proliferation of hospital expansion ensured hospitals’
role in the healthcare system moving forward.
More indicative of the preference for hospitals over physician treatment
is that CMS pays hospitals much more than it pays independent physicians
for the same procedures. 99 For example, a colonoscopy procedure is
reimbursed at a rate of $1,383 for hospitals, but only $625 for physicians.100
This discrepancy is far reaching, including physical therapy services,

91. TABLE 2 NAT’L HEALTH EXPENDITURES; AGGREGATE, ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE,
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION AND PER CAPITA AMOUNTS, BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE, CTR. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter TABLE 2],
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-andreports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html.
92. TABLE 1.3 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), TOTAL PERSONAL HEALTH CARE (PHC)
EXPENDITURES, HOSPITAL PHC, TOTAL MEDICARE PHC, AND MEDICARE HOSPITAL PHC:
SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1960-2012, (Oct. 1, 2015),https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareMedicaid
StatSupp/Downloads/2013_Section1.pdf#Table1.3.
93. Id.
94. See EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 18.
95. TABLE 2, supra note 91.
96. James D. Reschovksy & Chapin White, Location, Location, Location: Hospital Outpatient
Prices Much Higher than Community Settings for Identical Services, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH
CARE REFORM, Research Brief No. 16, at 1 (June 2014).
97. See generally EMANUEL, supra note 3.
98. Id.
99. Reschovksy & White, supra note 96, at 3.
100. Id. at 2 (“Price comparisons are based on claims data for 16,566 colonoscopies with
complete and clear information about the site of service—9,782 conducted in HOPDs and 6,784 in
community settings.”).
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imaging services, and preventative screening tests.101 Procedures are often
paid at double, or even triple, to hospitals, with simply no justification.102
Hospitals are also becoming more economically unfeasible as the cost of
care rises, considering the costs associated with the academic teaching
aspects of hospitals, in addition to the large increase in staff positions as a
result of failing private practices.103 Physician-owned medical practices have
decreased from 70% of overall private practices in 2002 to less than 50% in
2008.104 During that same period, hospital-owned medical practices
increased from 22% to over 55%.105 The effects on the marketplace of the
consolidation of medical care into large, unchecked hospitals have already
shown to increase prices with less competition.106 For example, hospital
prices for a routine colonoscopy have between four to ten times,107 with no
correlation other than hospital market consolidation.108 This trend is present
in nearly all markets where hospital consolidation is present, and further
reinforces the fact that less market competition inevitably leads to increased
prices for consumers and the federal government.109
An even graver consequence of this consolidation is the uncertain
economic outlook for physicians, which removes their ability to dictate care.
A shift from static salaries to incentive or volume-based payment incentivizes
physicians to treat as many patients as possible, with less regard for the actual
care rendered.110 This is a direct attack on physicians’ ability to dictate patient
care in favor of a corporation’s ability to stay profitable.111
This shift has not even proven to be profitable for hospitals.112 Due to
administrative costs and other overhead expenses, hospitals actually lose
$150,000 to $250,000 annually for the first three years after hiring a
physician for a staff position (as opposed to an independent doctor with
admitting privileges).113 This further lends to the notion that physicians
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 3.
Id.
See EMANUEL, supra note 3, 18–36.
Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians—The Logic Behind
a Money-Losing Proposition, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1790, 1791 (2011).
105. Id.
106. Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, The Impact of Hospital Consolidation, ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON FOUND. (June 2012), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2012/06/the-impact-ofhospital-consolidation.html; Kocher & Sahni, supra note 104, at 1791.
107. John Carreyrou, Nonprofit Hospitals Flex Pricing Power: In Roanoke, Va., Carilion’s Fees
Exceed Those of Competitors: The $4,727 Colonoscopy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2008, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121986172394776997.
108. Gaynor & Town, supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. Kocher & Shani, supra note 104, at 1792 (“Although some physicians may not want to trade
autonomy for employment, they must understand that hospitals are under pressure to implement
cost-saving strategies, which may benefit consumers if savings are passed on through lower
prices.”).
111. Casalino et al., supra note 12, at 1308, 1312.
112. See Kocher & Sahni, supra note 104, at 1790.
113. Id.
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fleeing to hospital staffs are not solving the financial problems of the
healthcare industry, and in fact may be increasing overall PHC. It is evident
that shifting to a hospital-based healthcare system will not be helpful in
accomplishing a sustainable PHC.
The designers of the Medicare system must realize that centralizing and
consolidating hospital systems run counter to the intentions of lowering costs
and improving the quality of care. By removing the discrepancy between
hospital and physician reimbursement rates, which only exists under the false
pretense that hospitals have an increased administrative burden,114 hospitals
would have to prioritize the types of patients and procedures they will accept.
This falls in line with the traditional notions of what types of services
hospitals were intended to provide, while leaving the majority of healthcare
to be administered by physicians in a private-practice setting.115
B. THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
In addition to Medicare and Medicaid, private health insurance is a huge
player in the total PHC. Although many of our European counterparts have
shifted towards a one-payer system, where the federal government acts as a
universal health insurer, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010116 actually improved private insurances’ financial position. When
health insurance was at its infancy, President Roosevelt explicitly stated that
any insurance that paid for physician services (as opposed to hospital
services) should not interfere with physicians’ ability to determine patient
care, stating, “no third party should come between physician and patients,
and the medical profession should control medical practice.”117 However, it
was impossible to imagine the industry that health insurance would become
in the modern world. A series of depression-era pieces of legislation,
specifically the Stabilization Act of 1942,118 established that insurance
benefits to employees were not to be considered “income” for tax purposes.
In 1954, a tax exclusion codified this concept; it “explicitly stated that
the monetary value of health insurance employers sponsored was not part of
the workers’ income . . . .”119 That exclusion, in conjunction with unions
gaining the ability to negotiate health insurance with employers,120 created a
114. If the administrative costs are indeed higher, it only lends to the notion of avoiding these
costs. By allowing the administrative behemoth to continue to grow by giving it more resources,
Medicare is propping up a system that is less financially feasible.
115. Casalino et. al., supra note 12, at 1307–08.
116. See generally Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012)); Rice et al., supra note 5.
117. See Stabilization Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-729, 56 Stat. 765 (1942) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 961–71); EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 29.
118. See generally Stabilization Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-729, 56 Stat. 765 (1942) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 961–71).
119. EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 31.
120. Id. (“[I]n 1949 the National Labor Relations Board ruled in the famous Inland Steel
Company case that unions, as part of their negotiations for wages, could negotiate for fringe benefits
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huge incentive to acquire private insurance, due to the fact that a dollar spent
by an employer and received by an employee was a tax-free benefit.121 This
led to the proliferation of health insurance across the country.122 As a result,
there was an increasing need to broaden the insurance pool so that the
premiums paid by healthy individuals could offset the cost that sick
individuals imposed in requiring constant care and medication.123 To help
illustrate this point, “[t]he 5 percent of the population with higher health care
expenses (greater than $ 18,086 annually) was responsible for half (49.5
percent) of total health care spending, whereas the 50 percent of the
population with the lowest expenses (less than $829) accounted for only 2.7
percent of total spending.”124 The increased availability of insurance has
created the tendency for hypochondria, or illness anxiety disorder.125
Essentially, the abundance of insurance, combined with the desire to use what
you pay for, enables hypochondriacs to seek medical care and an abundance
of preventative screenings, increasing the cost of overall PHC. Another term
for this is “adverse selection,” a process that leads to a feedback loop of
increasing costs for the ill. This further de-incentivizes healthy individuals
from purchasing coverage, leading to even higher premiums.126
What sets the United States apart from other industrialized countries is
the use of private insurance companies, who act as middlemen between the
government, beneficiaries, and physicians.127 Medicare supplements are
mandated to spend at least 80% of their net revenue on reimbursements.128
This figure is taken after administrative and corporate costs, including oftenexorbitant salaries for officers and directors.129 Health insurance is, at its most
fundamental level, a large administrative agency.130 The industry acts as a
contractor for the federal government; Congress delegated the administration
like health insurance. The US Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, thereby encouraging unions to
demand employer-sponsored health insurance.”).
121. See id.
122. Rice et al., supra note 5.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(J) (“By significantly increasing health insurance coverage and the size
of purchasing pools, which will increase economies of scale, the requirement, together with the
other provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce administrative costs and lower health
insurance premiums.”).
124. See EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 38.
125. Illness Anxiety Disorder, THE MAYO CLINIC (July 2, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/illness-anxiety-disorder/basics/definition/con-20124064; EMANUEL, supra
note 3, at 42.
126. EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 42.
127. Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance Markets, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 91 (2002).
128. Rate Review & the 80/20 Rule, HEALTHCARE [hereinafter The 80/20 Rule], https://www.
healthcare.gov/health-care-law-protections/rate-review/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
129. Id.
130. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Unhealthy Determinations: Controlling “Medical
Necessity,” 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 435 (2015); see also Timothy P. Blanchard, “Medical
Necessity” Determinations—A Continuing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599
(2004).
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of Medicare and Medicaid to private insurers, instead of handling the claims
and billing in-house.131 This middleman position between physicians,
patients, and the government empowered the insurance industry to value its
profits over the welfare of its beneficiaries. Although eliminating the “big
insurance” industry altogether might be unrealistic, requiring a higher payfloor, such as 90%, or legislating stricter regulations and government
oversight, could provide the necessary financial relief necessary.
IV. RISING OVERHEAD COSTS
As physician reimbursement stagnates, the cost of running a private
practice continues to rise. In addition to ordinary business insurance,
physicians must also pay premiums for malpractice insurance, which has no
benefit floor.132 Some physicians pay over $100,000 annually in malpractice
insurance, while nearly 80% of malpractice claims are considered
frivolous.133 In addition, 5% of physicians will face a malpractice claim
annually, even in light of the majority of these suits being considered
frivolous.134 Specialists, such as neurosurgeons, face a 19.1% malpractice
rate annually.135 These factors indicate how great the insurance companies
control of the healthcare industry is and how much they can profit off the top.
Physicians bill Medicare with a coding system, called the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD), which was reworked in 2015.136 This
complex system often requires the hiring of administrative employees, whose
sole purpose is to navigate this complex coding and reimbursement system.137
The newly instituted ICD-10-CM codes are estimated to increase physicians’
billing costs by nearly 300%.138 The mandatory transition from the ICD-9CM coding to the ICD-10-CM coding, effective October 1, 2015, required
physicians to utilize approximately 68,000 different codes, compared to
13,000 ICD-9-CM codes, for the exact same number of diagnoses.139 Every
procedure performed by a physician or other healthcare worker (e.g., nurses,
131. See Dolgin, supra note 130, at 443–44; see Blanchard, supra note 130, at 606, 611.
132. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to

Negligence: Results of The Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 4, 245
(1991).
133. EMANUEL, supra note 3, at 121.
134. Kimon Bekelis & Symeon Missios, The Practice of Cranial Neurosurgery and the
Malpractice Liability Environment in the United States, PLOS ONE, Mar. 2015, at 2.
135. Id.
136. AM. MED. ASS’N, PREPARING FOR THE ICD-10 CODE SET (2014), https://www.unitypoint.
org/waterloo/filesimages/for%20providers/icd9-icd10-differences.pdf [hereinafter PREPARING FOR
THE ICD-10].
137. Dan Mangan, Docs Face “Crushing” Costs from Diagnosis Code Switch, AMA Says,
FUNDAMENTAL REFOUNDING (Feb. 12, 2014, 7:08 PM), http://fundamentalrefounding.ning.com/
forum/topics/doctors-face-crushing-costs-from-diagnosis-code-switch-amasays?xg_source=activity.
138. Id.
139. See PREPARING FOR THE ICD-10, supra note 136.
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physical therapists, physician assistants) must be translated into a unique ICD
code.140
Independent of the merits of this recent change, the increased cost of
billing should be reflected in physician reimbursement rates. The inability to
navigate this expansive new coding system may render a physician unable to
receive Medicare reimbursements.141 Changes in technology are inevitable;
however, to place this burden solely on physicians is unreasonable—it should
instead be supplemented with tax incentives or payments from other areas of
healthcare, such as insurance companies or Medicare.
Similarly, the introduction of Electronic Health Records (EHR) places an
additional financial burden on physicians.142 Physicians are required to adopt
EHR for handling patient records, in order to streamline data and
theoretically secure Protected Health Information (PHI) from unauthorized
access and misuse.143 Failure to transfer from traditional record keeping to
EHR triggers mandatory reimbursement decreases for Medicare.144 This
deduction can range from 1-3% across the board annually.145 It is seemingly
unfair—the government imposes these technological requirements on
physicians with little or no reimbursement for the substantial cost, in both
time and money, and expects them to be able to survive on their own, with
no increase in reimbursement rates that could help cover it.
The average cost to implement EHR was $44,000 in 2005, with an
estimated $8,500 in annual maintenance costs.146 Those figures do not take
into account the additional hours physicians worked to learn the system. 147
The “incentive” to transition to EHR will only reimburse physicians up to a
maximum of $8,500 annually for five years.148
Thus, physicians must now employ individuals for billing, coding, and
record keeping.149 A physician must hire, on average, five additional
140. See Mangan, supra note 137.
141. Id.
142. See generally Robert H. Miller et al., The Value of Electronic Health Records in Solo or

Small Group Practices, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1127 (2005).
143. See generally id.; see also Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive Payment System
(MIPS) and Alternative Payment Model (APM) Incentive Under the Physician Fee Schedule, and
Criteria for Physician Focused Payment Models, 60 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,219 (proposed Nov. 4,
2016) (to be codified 42 C.F.R. pts. 414, 495).
144. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: COST ESTIMATE, S. 1347 ELECTRONIC HEALTH
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2015 (2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-20
16/costestimate/s1347_0.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Miller et al., supra note 142, at 1127.
147. Id. at 1127.
148. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD
INCENTIVE PAYMENTS FOR ELIGIBLE PROFESSIONALS (2013), https://www.cms.gov/RegulationsandGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/MLN_MedicaidEHRProgram_TipShee
t_EP.pdf.
149. Carol Peckham, Clinical and Office Staff Salary Report 2015, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/public/staff-salary-report-2015#page=4.
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employees for each office, just in order to comply with the new coding and
record keeping responsibilities.150 This is in addition to receptionists and any
allied health workers151 the office employs.152 Although Congress and
Medicare imposed these complicated and gratuitous requirements, physician
reimbursement rates have not reflected this change. This is a perfect example
of Congress not doing enough to ensure a reasonable transition for
physicians, but instead creating new law without paying for it.
CONCLUSION
Physicians should not have to bear the burden of healthcare reform on
their own. In light of CMS’ greater transparency through data reporting, it is
apparent that physicians are reimbursed for much less than 5% of PHC.153
The Medicare program must be revamped in order to achieve sustainable and
predictable healthcare costs, and it can be achieved by cutting excess
spending.
The “no interference” clause of Medicare Part D154 should be amended
to allow the Department of Health and Human Services and CMS to negotiate
with pharmaceutical companies. The government already does this on a
regular basis in other industries, and to have an absolute bar to negotiation
costs the United States billions of dollars annually.155 The potential savings
will remove the need to continue freezing or reducing physicians’
reimbursements, which will allow physicians to continue in private practice.
In addition, the continued prevalence of insurance companies throughout
the process is a product of limited resources. By passing off the
administrative headache to insurance companies, the federal government is
subsidizing the middlemen, allowing them to profit 20% of net revenue for
simply connecting physicians and patients.156 Raising the minimum
expenditure, or pay floor, from 80% to 90%, can help provide the necessary
financial relief.
Hospital expansion and consolidation reduces competition and adds
increased corporate influence over the delivery of healthcare. Instead of
incentivizing the hospital setting by reimbursing procedures at double or
often triple the rate of physician reimbursement, the rates should be the same.
Physicians’ overhead and administrative costs are increasing at least at the
same rate, and therefore there is little to no justification for the reimbursement
disparity. As a result of the ever-rising healthcare costs, due in large part to
excessive pharmaceutical and insurance spending, physicians have less
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
This includes physician assistants, nurses, and registered nurses.
Peckham, supra note 149.
TABLE 1.2, supra note 39.
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111 (2012).
Luhby, supra note 66.
The 80/20 Rule, supra note 128.
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control over the practice of medicine. Further, by improving reimbursement,
physicians can spend more time per patient and improve the quality of care
they provide. This problem can be addressed by finding ways to cut spending,
by allowing the government to negotiate a reduction in drug prices, and by
implementing tighter regulatory control over insurance companies.
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